En las dos últimas décadas, se ha producido dentro de la filosofía analítica un aumento repentino de la investigación sobre la naturaleza y el papel que juea la intuición. Los filósofos empezaron a investigar qué es la intuición, cómo debería definirse, qué papel desempeña en la filosofía, cuál es su estatus epistémico, entre otras cosas. También hay un número creciente de filósofos que sostienen que todo el debate se basa en un error: la intuición en filosofía no desempeña papel alguno (...) y los filósofos no la utilizan como (fuente de) prueba para sus afirmaciones filosóficas. Esta estrategia se lleva a cabo a menudo diferenciando entre los dos sentidos en los que se supone que la intuición desempeña un papel evidencial en filosofía. Así, la intuición puede entenderse como un estado de intuir o como un contenido proposicional que se intuye. En el primer sentido, se argumenta, la intuición no puede ser tratada como evidencia, ya que presentaría el riesgo de psicologizar la evidencia en filosofía. Sin embargo, si tomamos la intuición como evidencia en el segundo sentido, no hay nada distintivo en ella: en última instancia, toda evidencia en filosofía es de naturaleza proposicional, independientemente de la intuitividad de una proposición dada. En mi artículo, sostengo que esta estrategia fracasa y propongo, en su lugar, una visión de la intuición que, en primer lugar, explica por qué la distinción mencionada no hace que la intuitividad del contenido sea irrelevante para su estatus epistémico; en segundo lugar, está de acuerdo con los hallazgos actuales en psicología; y, en tercer lugar, es lo suficientemente mínima como para permitir la incorporación de las diferentes perspectivas sobre las intuiciones. En particular, sostengo que un juicio intuitivo, caracterizado por su no inferencialidad y revocabilidad, sirve de prueba para determinadas afirmaciones filosóficas, mientras que su fuente es una intuición entendida como un estado de carácter no proposicional que puede examinarse empíricamente. (shrink)

In recent years a lot of metaphilosophical attention has been paid to the role of thought experiments in philosophical inquiry. According to the popular picture, thought experiments are among the most prominent methods for conceptual analysis. However, it is also often claimed that thought experiments in ethics differ from those that are used in other fields of philosophy as being of a different nature—they are not about the concepts, but rather about the things in the world (what those things exactly (...) are depends on the particular metaethical theory one subscribes to). In the paper I argue that this claim is wrong. Conceptual analysis is of a huge value to ethics for it substantially helps to clarify the concepts one uses while making a moral judgment. It is very often the case that the apparent moral disagreement between two subjects turns out to be superficial since it is rooted in the misunderstanding on the conceptual level, for example when one uses some concept equivocally. Moreover, through thought experiments conceptual analysis can help to bring out the tacit assumptions that relate to the concepts involved. (shrink)

We examine how social diversity and inclusiveness on corporate boards affect corporate performance and monitoring in Sri Lanka, a country subject to decades of polarization, civil war, and even genocide. Barely more than a decade after the civil war, we find that board social diversity on the basis of ethnicity, religion, language, gender, and nationality of the board members is positively related to corporate performance, both in terms of stock market performance and accounting returns, and to corporate financial stability. The (...) main positive effects of social diversity derive from ethno-linguistic inclusiveness. The results are confirmed by an instrumental variable approach that addresses endogeneity issues. We find no evidence that inter-personal and moral conflicts or communication problems among board members negatively affect firm performance. (shrink)

Sharing on social media has become a daily routine for millions of users worldwide. Sharing transforms the experience of international migration as it enables migrants to maintain social relations and adapt to a new socioeconomic environment. But what does the term “sharing” mean for migrants active on Facebook? What are the contemporary meanings of sharing encouraged by Facebook’s affordances? This paper explores individual sharing strategies on Facebook among Polish migrants in Germany and the UK. On the basis of the material (...) collected through in-depth interviews (N=17) with Poles who have settled in Germany and the UK, it is proposed that the contemporary meaning of sharing has five dimensions: commercial, altruistic, social, connective and addictive. Different compositions of these dimensions can be found in most sharing practices on social media. Following a critique of commercial sharing on social media, it is further established that selling and other profit-driven activities are rather well recognized by the interviewees. However, some of them engage in commercial sharing with no direct selling intention. The article emphasizes that sharing practices help Polish migrants adapt to their bicultural reality in Germany and the UK. (shrink)

Předkládaná esej se snaží představit koncept identity v kritické perspektivě a v širším kontextu problému demarkace v sociálních vědách. V souladu se známou statí Beyond "Identity" (Brubaker, Cooper) si pokládám otázku, zda je koncept identity nadále užitečný a vhodný coby analytický nástroj ve společenských vědách. Pozornost věnuji jak samotnému zanesení konceptu na pole sociálních věd, tak i srovnání a zhodnocení esencialistického, konstruktivistického a dekonstruktivistického pojetí, přičemž tyto tři způsoby uchopení daného pojmu vnímám zároveň jako reprezentace různých postojů k sociální realitě, (...) k možnosti skutečného poznání (episteme/doxa) a ke vztahu vědeckého a nevědeckého pole. Kriticky reflektuji všechna tři pojetí a argumentuji ve prospěch nahrazení konceptu identity, avšak také ve prospěch posílení (auto)kritického vnímání ve spojitosti k užívaným vědeckým konceptům a nástrojům, jakožto i k vědcům samotným. (shrink)

At Protagoras 353de, Socrates gives three possible reasons for calling some pleasures `wrong'. Scholarly attention has focused on the second of these, according to which pleasures are `wrong' when they have negative consequences. This paper argues that the first reason (the pleasures are fleeting) corresponds to beliefs held by Democritus, among others; and that the third reason (the pleasant things “give pleasure in whatever way and for whatever reason“) is the view adopted by Socrates in the dialogue.

We investigate interpolation properties of many-valued propositional logics related to continuous t-norms. In case of failure of interpolation, we characterize the minimal interpolating extensions of the languages. For finite-valued logics, we count the number of interpolating extensions by Fibonacci sequences.

Robots are becoming more visible parts of our life, a situation which prompts questions about their place in our society. One group of issues that is widely discussed is connected with robots’ moral and legal status as well as their potential rights. The question of granting robots rights is polarizing. Some positions accept the possibility of granting them human rights whereas others reject the notion that robots can be considered potential rights holders. In this paper, I claim that robots will (...) never have all human rights, even if we accept that they are morally equal to humans. I focus on the role of embodiment in the content of the law. I claim that even relatively small differences in the ontologies of entities could lead to the need to create new sets of rights. I use the example of Neanderthals to illustrate that entities similar to us might have required different legal statuses. Then, I discuss the potential legal status of human-like robots. (shrink)

This work sets out to present how the notion of delusion may be understood (and extended) within the semantic framework of Robert Brandom's inferentialism. The mechanisms of reliability and community‐oriented proprieties, among others, provide inferentialists with effective tools for understanding commitments (and so beliefs) in communities. These tools may be used to describe and assess both commitments that we might consider sound and commitments that we might consider delusional, both in terms of how they arise and in terms of how (...) they may be reinforced. Delusions are accordingly rendered in perspectival and normative terms, which is elaborated through a number of examples. The picture of how a delusional commitment may be understood, how it may be reinforced, and its character as community internal or external provide some interesting perspectives on delusions in shared social contexts, as well as how they may originate intractable conflicts and disconnects between sub‐groups within a broader linguistic community. (shrink)

Praca zawiera pogłębioną analizę dwóch ważnych, powiązanych ze sobą doktryn – utylitaryzmu i liberalizmu. Ich powstanie i rozwój zbiega się z historią uprzemysłowionego świata Zachodu. XIX wiek to bez wątpienia okres pełnego rozkwitu liberalizmu w jego klasycznej postaci. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) jest kluczową postacią w historii obydwu doktryn. Jego dialog z utylitaryzmem ma w tle współczesne dylematy i takież interpretacje.

The aim of this paper is to examine the theoretical architecture of semantic atomism and its consequences with respect to natural language. In particular, it looks to explore the notion of possible concepts using the fundamental distinction between simple and complex concepts and expressions in Jerry Fodor’s atomism. The distinction is exploited to produce an unusual type of concept referred to as a correlate, which effectively mirrors complex concepts while maintaining a distinct underlying structure. Though harmless in and of themselves, (...) their presence in the context of polymorphemic expressions suggests that atomism harbors a tacit and unintuitive form of polysemy that is problematic in its own right and that leads to other complications, some of which may be demonstrated on the example of communication. These issues are tied to the way atomism is structured, and although they seem to have gone largely unnoticed, they appear to bear negatively on the adequacy of atomism where natural language is concerned. (shrink)

Profesor Ryszard Panasiuk przez ostatnich kilka dekad należał do grona wiodących polskich filozofów. Jego książki na temat Hegla, ruchu młodoheglowskiego czy Marksa należą do kanonu historiografii idei. Publikowany tutaj obszerny wywiad z Profesorem może stanowić wartościowe i oryginalne źródło do historii inteligencji i humanistyki w tzw. Polsce Ludowej. Profesor Panasiuk opowiada w nim o swojej karierze naukowej, jednocześnie kreśląc obraz przemian akademickiego środowiska filozoficznego w powojennej Polsce. Wiele uwagi poświęca również swojej relacji z Bronisławem Baczką i innymi wybitnym reprezentantami Warszawskiej (...) Szkoły Historii Idei. Ponadto Profesor analizuje proces narastania prądów dysydenckich wśród zwolenników marksizmu po Październiku ’56 i wyjaśnia ostateczny rozkład post-stalinowskiej ortodoksji w polskim życiu intelektualnym tego okresu. Jak również dowodzi, że choć Marks stanowi ważny i wciąż warty badania rozdział w historii filozofii europejskiej, to marksizm, z uwagi na zawarty w nim koncept „radykalnej wspólnoty”, jest ideologią z gruntu utopijną. (shrink)